The Battle of Savo Island, 8/9 August 1942
-Jason
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The Battle of Savo Island took place on the night of 8/9 August 1942 in the water off the shores of Guadalcanal. The engagement saw American, Australian, and Japanese warships fighting in the dark. The Japanese scored a major naval victory that shook the Allies and forced the evacuation of the transports from the region. The tenuous American hold on Guadalcanal, and the fate of the Marines who had already landed, was thrown into question.
The United States Navy had overall command of Operation Watchtower, the invasion and occupation of Guadalcanal, and this was the first Allied amphibious attack in the Pacific Theater of Operations. 16,000 US Marines were landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi beginning on 7 August. While opposition on the islands had been non-existent, the unloading of the supplies for the garrisons was behind schedule, making the Navy commanders nervous. Despite Marines seizing the airfield, Guadalcanal was still easily within range of several enemy airbases. The Japanese base at Rabaul, located on the island of New Britain, had many bombers and fighters, as well as a significant naval presence, that could strike the vulnerable transports and warships around Guadalcanal.
US Admiral Frank Fletcher was the commander of the Allied naval forces operating in the Solomon Islands. He was rightfully worried about the Japanese launching air raids that could sink his aircraft carriers. The United States Navy had few operational aircraft carriers in the Pacific, and it would be months before new ones would be completed and deployed. Fletcher made the decision to move his carriers away from Guadalcanal to refuel and resupply them outside the range of Japanese. He left most of the American and Australian cruisers and destroyers, under the command of Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley, to cover the Marines and transports. Those ships included eight cruisers and fifteen destroyers positioned to protect the vulnerable transport anchorage.
Once the Japanese received information that the Allies had landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi, they quickly organized a powerful naval strike force. Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa was given command of seven cruisers and one destroyer. He had orders to sail from New Britain and engage the American forces around Guadalcanal. Mikawa did not know the disposition of the Allied fleet and had orders to hit the enemy warships at night and return to Rabaul before daybreak to avoid Allied air attacks. The Japanese sailors were eager to avenge the Empire’s losses from the Battle of Midway.
The Solomons have a unique geographical makeup: there was a channel, called the New Georgia Sound, which ran between parallel strings of islands and was nicknamed “the Slot.” “The Slot” became the oceanic highway through which Japanese warships transited to repeatedly strike the American military garrisons throughout the campaign. Savo Island was a small dot of land that sat 9.3 miles northeast of Cape Esperance, the northern tip of Guadalcanal. Its position proved to be an obstacle for the Allied naval units patrolling the New Georgia Sound: ships could not form a solid line to defend the anchorage. To correct this, the Rear Admiral Crutchley split his warships into different patrol groups to cover both the northern and southern channels around Savo Island. This proved to be a mistake as the Allied warships were not used to working with each other and were not well versed in night-fighting.
As the day of 8 August turned towards night, the Allied naval forces began their patrols. Two destroyer groups were positioned to sail both the northern and southern channels around Savo Island. Several Allied cruisers were deployed to cover the northern approaches to the transport anchorage. Despite these precautions, the Allied sailors were at several disadvantages: a false sense of security had descended on the naval forces, a distrust of the newly developed surface-radar on several warships, and the lack of night-fighting training crippled the American and Australian response. Because the Marines had taken the Japanese-controlled islands so quickly with no real resistance, many Allied service members did not fear counterattacks. Crutchley, as well as other American commanders, was wary of radar and felt that the new technology was too unreliable to trust. During the decades between World Wars I and II the budget for training had been slashed for the US Armed Services and training for night-fighting had been severely curtailed: this would prove fatal for hundreds of Allied sailors.
Admiral Mikawa had managed to avoid Allied air attack after departing Rabaul and was speeding towards Guadalcanal. His crews were extremely well versed in night-fighting tactics and were fully prepared to take advantage of that expertise. One of the deadliest weapons in their arsenal was the Type 93, or Long Lance, torpedo with which all the Japanese ships were armed. This torpedo was the most advanced of its type at the time and had been developed specifically to attack the American warships. It left no visible wake or stream of bubbles and this was perfect for launching surprise torpedo attacks in the dark. Once the Long Lances had been unleashed, the Japanese warships would finish off any damaged ships with their guns. The Japanese task force was primed to deliver a devastating blow.
Admiral Crutchley was onboard the HMAS Australia discussing with his fellow commanders the consequences of Fletcher’s withdrawal of the American aircraft carriers. The lack of aircover would mean that the transports had no protection against Japanese planes. As this meeting was taking place, the Allied cruisers and destroyers were spilt into several groups. They lacked a strong plan of defense against surprise attack. At the end of the meeting, for some unknown reason, Crutchley did not shift the Australia back to the Tulagi anchorage and did not inform anyone of his intentions or location. This oversight was another costly mistake as Allied captains could not find their commander and one which historians still do not understand.
The radar-equipped American destroyers operating off the western coast of Savo Island missed the Japanese column sailing towards them. The USS Blue turned away from the 2-mile-long enemy formation after it completed one of its patrol tracks. The Japanese warships had orders to attack the two Allied anchorages to the north of Guadalcanal and south of Tulagi and then withdraw. Mikawa hoped to destroy as much of the covering fleet and transports as possible in a lightning-fast attack. The lack of Allied awareness of his column was an unexpected boon. The Japanese crews spotted the Allied cruisers in the southern force at 1:31 am and launched torpedoes. Japanese scout planes dropped flares on the startled Allied ships, signaling the Japanese gunners to also open fire, and this added to the confusion and disorientation of the Allied sailors.
The Australian cruiser Canberra attempted to engage the Japanese column but was disabled by torpedo hits. The USS Chicago also increased speed in attempt to attack the intruders but, she too, was disabled by gunfire and torpedo hits. Both Allied cruisers lost power and burned fiercely as the Japanese warships next turned to the northern anchorage. American destroyers attached to the cruisers fired torpedoes and shells against the enemy formation but scored no hits. Mikawa’s ships swung away from the vulnerable transports and sped towards the three remaining Allied cruisers cruising to the north. The engagement, which had only lasted minutes, had shattered this part of the Allied fleet. The Japanese ships had split into two parallel columns and formed a deadly crossfire the Allied ships.
By 1:44 am the Allied southern covering force was in shambles and the northern force had no idea what was happening. The USS Astoria, USS Quincy, and USS Vincennes were the core of the Tulagi anchorage covering force and were totally unprepared for the catastrophe heading their way. The captains of the three cruisers were asleep, and their column was cruising at only 10 knots. Mikawa’s task force fired torpedoes at the Americans at 1:44 am and by 1:50 am they illuminated the stunned Allies with powerful searchlights. The American crews desperately tried to defend themselves.
The Astoria’s captain feared that this was a mistake - friendly forces were firing on each other. He ordered the Astoria to stop firing but, as shells slammed into his ship, he realized his mistake. It was too late; the Astoria was a flaming wreck. The Quincy suffered even more punishment caught in a crossfire between Japanese columns. The cruiser sank bow first at 2:38 am. The Vincennes was hit 74 times before it sank at 2:50 am. The northern Allied cruiser force had been decimated.
Admiral Mikawa was faced with two choices: he could press on his attack and destroy the American transport ships, or he could turn his force towards home and race against the sunrise. The Japanese had not found the American aircraft carriers and there was the threat of Allied air attacks once the sun came up. While the destruction of the transports was important, the preservation of Japanese naval assets was more vital. Mikawa ordered his ships to turn and make the run to Rabaul.
The Japanese had achieved a stunning tactical victory in the waters around Savo Island. Admiral Fletcher ordered the surviving Allied warships and transports to weigh anchor and sail out of the combat zone. The American Navy suffered the loss of four heavy cruisers, one damaged heavy cruiser, and two damaged destroyers. Overall, 1,077 Allied sailors were killed in the action while the Japanese suffered only 58 dead and minor damage to several ships. The Battle of Savo Island would be the first of five major surface engagements around Guadalcanal throughout the course of the campaign. So many Allied and Japanese warships were sunk around the island that the waterway became known as Ironbottom Sound.